Donald Trump and Yuval Noah Harari

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Introducing for the first time
Pharaoh on the microphone
Sing all hail
What will be revealed today
When we peer into the great unknown
From the line to the throne
          The New Pornographers, “The Laws Have Changed

Informed of a rival’s demise, the scheming, turn-of-the-19th-century French diplomat Talleyrand could be heard muttering, “I wonder what he meant by that?” So goes “the great game of politics,” in which even death is perceived as but another move. Of course, real politics is no game; still, there’s a long tradition of confusing the two. It’s the same with war, which is why Clausewitz once felt it necessary to declare that “war is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end.”

To treat something serious as if it were a game is to aestheticize it − to take it out of the domain that we might call “the practical” and put it in “the aesthetic.” The practical is where we strive to fulfil our values or interests; to do things, that is, for our sakes. By contrast, in the aesthetic we take on a disinterested attitude and so do things for “their own sakes,” as the saying goes. This can be a lot of fun, and fun is the ultimate goal, but we can only reach it indirectly, which is why, to repeat the point, a game’s rules are respected for their own sakes rather than for some practical end. Why should I kick the ball in that goal or shoot the puck in this net? Because that’s how the game is played, nothing more. And why can’t I pick up the ball with my hands or kick the puck in with my skate? Because these things would violate the rules − rules, again, which exist simply because we couldn’t play without them. Of course it’s possible to play a game seriously, which is what professional athletes do, for example. But their salaries or glory are things that exist outside of the game, in the practical rather than in the aesthetic, since one can always play for free or without a care for the recognition of others.

There are three other modes of the aesthetic, and these exist alongside playing for fun and often overlap with it. They are disinterested appreciating, as when you savour something or enjoy its beauty, whether it be an artwork, a fine wine, or a person; disinterested imagining, when you fantasize by using your imagination in ways unrestricted by fact, letting it “run free”; and disinterested presenting, when you put on an entertaining show, a spectacle. … Continue reading

Donald Trump and John Rawls

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“We’ve gone on holiday by mistake.”
                             Withnail and I

Informed of a rival’s demise, the scheming, turn-of-the-19th-century French diplomat Talleyrand could be heard muttering, “I wonder what he meant by that?” So goes “the great game of politics,” in which even death is perceived as but another move. Of course, real politics is no game; still, there’s a long tradition of confusing the two. It’s the same with war, which is why Clausewitz once felt it necessary to declare that “war is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end.”

To treat something serious as if it were a game is to aestheticize it − to take it out of the domain that we might call “the practical” and put it in “the aesthetic.” The practical is where we strive to fulfil our values or interests; to do things, that is, for our sakes. By contrast, in the aesthetic we take on a disinterested attitude and so do things for “their own sakes,” as the saying goes. This can be a lot of fun, and fun is the ultimate goal, but we can only reach it indirectly, which is why, to repeat the point, a game’s rules are respected for their own sakes rather than for some practical end. Why should I kick the ball in that goal or shoot the puck in this net? Because that’s how the game is played, nothing more. And why can’t I pick up the ball with my hands or kick the puck in with my skate? Because these things would violate the rules − rules, again, which exist simply because we couldn’t play without them. Of course it’s possible to play a game seriously, which is what professional athletes do, for example. But their salaries or glory are things that exist outside of the game, in the practical rather than in the aesthetic, since one can always play for free or without a care for the recognition of others.

There are three other modes of the aesthetic, and these exist alongside playing for fun and often overlap with it. They are disinterested appreciating, as when you savour something or enjoy its beauty, whether it be an artwork, a fine wine, or a person; disinterested imagining, when you fantasize by using your imagination in ways unrestricted by fact, letting it “run free”; and disinterested presenting, when you put on an entertaining show, a spectacle. … Continue reading

The Liberal-Communitarian Debate

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So shone in sunlight the fine pointed spear
That the republican poised in his right hand
With deadly aim at brilliant Dworkin
At his skin where most it lay exposed.
For nearly all was covered
By the bronze gear Dworkin had taken
From slain Sandel.
It showed only the bare throat
Where the collarbones divided neck and shoulders,
Where the death of the soul is quickest.
So here was where, as the liberal charged,
The republican drove his point home.
The end came quick, and death closed upon the lawyer,
Spirit from his body fluttered to undergloom,
Bewailing fate that made him leave his youth
And neutrality behind. And as the man died
The republican spoke. He said:

“Die, make an end.
You who has made a world
Where there is nothing worth dying for
And nothing good on TV.”

 

(Oxford 1992. With apologies to Fitzgerald and Lattimore’s Homers.)

Isaiah Berlin and the Enlightenment

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Here’s the description provided of the book edited by Laurence Brockliss and Ritchie Robertson, Isaiah Berlin and the Enlightenment (Oxford University Press, 2016): “Isaiah Berlin (1909-97) was recognized as Britain’s most distinguished historian of ideas. Many of his essays discussed thinkers of what this book calls the ‘long Enlightenment’ (from Vico in the eighteenth century to Marx and Mill in the nineteenth, with Machiavelli as a precursor). Yet he is particularly associated with the concept of the ‘Counter-Enlightenment’, comprising those thinkers (Herder, Hamann, and even Kant) who in Berlin’s view reacted against the Enlightenment’s naive rationalism, scientism and progressivism, its assumption that human beings were basically homogeneous and could be rendered happy by the remorseless application of scientific reason. Berlin’s ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ has received critical attention, but no-one has yet analysed the understanding of the Enlightenment on which it rests. Isaiah Berlin and the Enlightenment explores the development of Berlin’s conception of the Enlightenment, noting its curious narrowness, its ambivalence, and its indebtedness to a specific German intellectual tradition. Contributors to the book examine his comments on individual writers, showing how they were inflected by his questionable assumptions, and arguing that some of the writers he assigned to the ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ have closer affinities to the Enlightenment than he recognized. By locating Berlin in the history of Enlightenment studies, this book also makes a contribution to defining the historical place of his work and to evaluating his intellectual legacy.”

Replique (from the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews)

The fox, it seems, was wrong about many things. Isaiah Berlin’s accounts of Marx are “all flawed in non-trivial ways,” writes David Leopold (p. 23). And “there is no doubt that he penned a few [falsehoods] about Hume,” asserts P.J.E. Kail (p. 69). Karen O’Brien tells us that “Berlin does not provide anything resembling an accurate or rounded account of Montesquieu’s thought,” while Christopher Brooke complains that “Berlin never seems to have felt that he really had to engage with Rousseau as a serious theorist” (pp. 79, 93). Marian Hobson concludes that Berlin is mistaken to think that either Diderot or Hamann “fit into a simple category” (p. 112). Ritchie Robertson insists that Berlin would have recognized how Machiavelli is part of an alternative, minority branch of the Enlightenment if not for his “at best incomplete” account of it (p. 139). John Robertson declares Berlin’s portrayal of Vico “historically incoherent” (p. 159). And Kevin Hilliard feels a need to note that he is “certainly not claiming that Berlin was all wrong” when it comes to his account of Herder (p. 174). Lastly, we hear from Ken Koltun-Fromm that Berlin’s description of Moses Hess is more or less “seriously flawed and misguided,” and from Derek Offord that Berlin is “very partial” about the members of the Russian intelligentsia, indeed so much so that he takes us outside “the realm of scholarship, as we tend to conceive of it in early twenty-first-century academe, and in the direction of apology” (pp. 177, 199). … Continue reading

Une proposition de réconciliation

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Sorry, this entry is only available in French. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.

Un désaccord vient de surgir entre Gérard Bouchard et Charles Taylor, auteurs du rapport sur les accommodements raisonnables au Québec. Taylor n’est plus d’accord qu’il faut interdire le port des signes religieux par ceux qui exercent les fonctions dites « coercitives » de l’État, c’est-à-dire les juges et les policiers. Premièrement, la distinction entre ceux qui exercent ces fonctions et les autres n’a pas eu l’influence désirée pour le public visé. Et deuxièmement, le contexte au Québec à changer : l’interdiction proposée contribue à la stigmatisation des communautés d’où venaient les personnes visées.

Réplique

Je veux suggérer une façon de concilier les deux auteurs. Je crains toutefois qu’ils ne l’acceptent pas. Pour commencer, il faut se rappeler que la recommandation qu’il faut interdire le port des signes religieux fait suite à une remarque dans le rapport qui regarde d’un bon oeil la proposition du Bloc québécois suggérant que l’interdiction s’applique à tous ceux et celles qui incarnent l’État et sa neutralité. Il me semble pourtant y avoir ici confusion entre neutralité et impartialité. Après tout, si un intimé musulman s’interroge sur l’impartialité d’un juge juif portant une kippa, il n’aura moins des raisons de le faire face non seulement à un juge chrétien portant une croix non ostentatoire, mais aussi si le Juif remplace sa kippa par une plus petite, non ostentatoire, et aussi si tous les deux cachent leur confession en enlevant leurs symboles religieux complètement. Alors que, puisqu’il fait partie de la description de poste des juges d’avoir un bon jugement, pourquoi pas simplement leur faire confiance pour se récuser quand il y a un doute sur leur impartialité? On n’a pas besoin d’une loi. … Continue reading

Cinq jours à Paris

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Sorry, this entry is only available in French. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.

I

Les compagnies aériennes, dit-on, vendent plus de billets qu’il n’y a de place dans chaque avion. Quelle que soit la raison, c’est vrai cette fois-ci. Annonce d’Air Canada quinze minutes avant l’embarquement : « Nous avons vendu onze billets en double et devons régler la situation avant de recevoir les passagers à bord. » Murmure râleur dans la foule de la porte A-51. « Les onze passagers qui seront prêts à renoncer à partir ce soir… » Le murmure s’accroit, fusent même quelques remarques assassines. « … auront en compensation un billet d’une valeur de 800$ pour une destination de leur choix, en plus de l’hôtel pour cette nuit, le restaurant et un aller pour Paris demain. » En cinq minutes tout était réglé. Deux jeunes Françaises passent à côté de moi : « C’est un bon deal, quoi ! » … Continue reading

Some Exceptionalism Please, We’re Canadian

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Mark Kingwell begins “No exceptionalism please, we’re Canadian” by questioning the claim that Canada is extraordinary because it is post-national, has an especially secure banking system, an impeccable public health care system, and, above all, an open-minded, tolerant immigration policy. Kingwell used to believe these things but, today, even though he’s friends with some who do believe them and have published articles explaining why (for we’re “a small country. Maybe that’s the true exceptionalism in play here?”), he doubts any and all stories about how special we are. Indeed, they remind him of the philosopher Leibniz’s theodicy, his “sad, evil idea” that God made this the best of all possible worlds. It was rightly lampooned by Voltaire because it’s obvious that the world can be improved. In any case, Americans are the ones who tend to think that they’re exceptional and it makes them impervious to criticism. Even worse is how self-congratulatory it is. Better to recognize that Canada “is not the best of all possible countries, as recent arrivals and indigenous peoples will certainly attest. We are as rife as anyone else in intolerance, bigotry and ignorance…Sorry, friends.”

Replique

“Alright that’s it. I’m voting for Kellie Leitch.” … Continue reading

L’arène

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À quoi peut bien servir un blog ? Et un blog lié à la politique en plus (un autre) ?

La politique suscite en gros deux réactions.

La volonté d’entrer dans l’arène – celle de l’action ou celle des idées, si éloignées et si proches – pour y combattre au nom de la justice et de ce qu’on croit être le bien, ou du moins le mieux, ou même le moins pire. Entrer dans l’arène par nécessité, par solidarité, par agacement, par défi, par ambition, par goût du bruit, par besoin d’employer son énergie – il faut bien se dépenser quelque part – ou encore animé par cette vieille idée : ne pas laisser tout l’espace et toute l’influence aux médiocres (idée trop flatteuse, mais qui n’a pas parfois l’orgueil de penser avoir aussi son rôle à jouer ?)

La volonté contraire de prendre ses distances, d’aller voir ailleurs, d’aller faire un tour dans l’art, dans le rien, dans le temps qui passe, dans la vie, d’éviter l’ambiguïté des combats, de fuir les fausses solidarités, la naïveté vraie ou fausse qui confond le goût du pouvoir avec la lutte pour des idéaux. Par goût du silence et des mystères sans réponse, de l’inutile aimé pour lui-même. Pour se laisser aller à une misanthropie tranquille qui pourrait être aussi une meilleure façon, détachée, d’être avec. À distance avec les autres, avec le monde, par les milles et uns détours de la pensée et des impressions fugitives.

Ces deux volontés nous habitent tour à tour. Ce blog sera schizophrène ou ne sera pas. … Continue reading