Veut-on vraiment un État religieusement neutre?

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Les problèmes avec les approches actuelles

Ici au Québec, la question des accommodements raisonnables est responsable d’un tumultueux débat entre les tenants d’une laïcité « républicaine », tels que les péquistes Bernard Drainville et Jean-François Lisée, qui veulent un éventail très restreint d’accommodements liés aux croyances et pratiques de nature religieuse, et les tenants d’une laïcité « ouverte », comme Gérard Bouchard et Charles Taylor pour qui il faut en admettre un éventail plus large. Si les deux groupes s’entendent sur les principes de la séparation entre l’Église et l’État et la neutralité religieuse de ce dernier, ils sont en désaccord sur la façon de les interpréter.

C’était à prévoir, puisque les deux approches découlent des traditions de la pensée politique de deux pays différents, française dans le premier cas et américaine dans le second. … Continue reading

Language and Political Science in Canada

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[Note to readers: Not long ago, I was asked to contribute a post to Praxis: The Canadian Political Science Association Career Blog, which aims to “provide practical career advice for emerging and established political scientists in Canada.” I wrote something that essentially contains two pieces of advice: (i) that francophone political scientists need to watch out for the CPSA; and (ii) that anglophone political scientists need to reform it – if, that is, they want to be good colleagues. Admittedly, these two are more polemical than, say, suggestions about how to format one’s CV, but then I am a political philosopher. When the blog’s editors received my post, they asked for changes. I made the changes, but now they’re asking for more and so I’ve decided to give up on them and publish it here instead.]

C’est donc en anglais, la langue réelle de
l’Association canadienne de science
politique, et la langue du voyage, que
j’ai “choisi” de présenter cette allocution
présidentielle.
            Alain Noël, 28 May 2014

I’ve been asked to offer some career advice about working in political science in Canada. The question led me to recall, of all things, the uproar this past summer over that float at the Fête nationale parade here in Quebec, the one pushed by four black men wearing colonial khaki outfits and followed by a parading chorus of white people dressed, alas, all in white. Why did I think of the parade? Bear with me. Someone, a colleague, raised the question on Facebook as to whether it was possible – no more than this – that the four men were happy to participate in the parade. The question seems to me to reveal a failure to grasp the sometimes intricate workings of systemic racism. Which brings me to the case of the political scientists over at the Canadian Political Science Association. … Continue reading

Refusing Conversation

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I will not give you a penny more than you deserve
I don’t know why you bother asking anymore
All of your charm couldn’t make me change my mind
I will not give you a penny more than you deserve
…Whoa, for a lover, no one compares to you.
            The Skydiggers, “A Penny More

The hard Canadian
He don’t have much to say
But he hurts your feelings
Almost every single day
            Gordon Downie and the Country of Miracles, “The Hard Canadian

The Quebec government would like to have a conversation about the place of Quebec in Canada. They’ve published a document, Québécois : Notre façon d’être Canadiens / Quebecers: Our Way of Being Canadian, about their thinking and they’d like to hear back.

Not everyone’s open to this, however. “Vous connaissez mon opinion sur la Constitution,” replied the prime minister before the document was even released, “on n’ouvre pas la Constitution.” And if that’s too curt for you, here’s the sadly predictable conclusion of Andrew Coyne’s latest opinion piece in the National Post: “The same debates, the same fallacies, the same doubletalk, and all of it just as pointless and unnecessary as ever. There is no problem these proposals would solve, no power Quebec needs it does not already have. There is only the inexhaustible self-importance of its political class. How about we just don’t?”

Are these men clear about what’s being asked? There’s no “couteau sur la gorge” this time, nor even the suggestion, such as the one made by the wise but frustrated Charles Taylor in 1992, that Quebec issue an “ultimatum” should the conversation fail, that it “would signify the end of the country” (Taylor called for coupling this with “an expression of openness” so as to avoid “damaging the interlocutor.” As if). Some fellow Canadians are merely expressing a desire to talk. They’re dissatisfied about something and they want to see if we can work it out. Isn’t it the obligation of every good citizen to at least listen to them with an open mind?

Yes, there appears to be little new in the document (though I haven’t finished reading it yet). But what is new – and this is a major difference from the past – is not only the way it’s being presented but also the context. There’s no referendum on the horizon. The forces of sovereignty are extremely weak. Coyne, and evidently Trudeau, take this to mean not that we have an opportune moment here but that the issues raised can be dismissed, if not ignored outright. They’re wrong. We have a duty to respond – critically, if need be, but constructively.

More to come.

Donald Trump and Yuval Noah Harari

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Introducing for the first time
Pharaoh on the microphone
Sing all hail
What will be revealed today
When we peer into the great unknown
From the line to the throne
          The New Pornographers, “The Laws Have Changed

Informed of a rival’s demise, the scheming, turn-of-the-19th-century French diplomat Talleyrand could be heard muttering, “I wonder what he meant by that?” So goes “the great game of politics,” in which even death is perceived as but another move. Of course, real politics is no game; still, there’s a long tradition of confusing the two. It’s the same with war, which is why Clausewitz once felt it necessary to declare that “war is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end.”

To treat something serious as if it were a game is to aestheticize it − to take it out of the domain that we might call “the practical” and put it in “the aesthetic.” The practical is where we strive to fulfil our values or interests; to do things, that is, for our sakes. By contrast, in the aesthetic we take on a disinterested attitude and so do things for “their own sakes,” as the saying goes. This can be a lot of fun, and fun is the ultimate goal, but we can only reach it indirectly, which is why, to repeat the point, a game’s rules are respected for their own sakes rather than for some practical end. Why should I kick the ball in that goal or shoot the puck in this net? Because that’s how the game is played, nothing more. And why can’t I pick up the ball with my hands or kick the puck in with my skate? Because these things would violate the rules − rules, again, which exist simply because we couldn’t play without them. Of course it’s possible to play a game seriously, which is what professional athletes do, for example. But their salaries or glory are things that exist outside of the game, in the practical rather than in the aesthetic, since one can always play for free or without a care for the recognition of others.

There are three other modes of the aesthetic, and these exist alongside playing for fun and often overlap with it. They are disinterested appreciating, as when you savour something or enjoy its beauty, whether it be an artwork, a fine wine, or a person; disinterested imagining, when you fantasize by using your imagination in ways unrestricted by fact, letting it “run free”; and disinterested presenting, when you put on an entertaining show, a spectacle. … Continue reading

Donald Trump and John Rawls

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“We’ve gone on holiday by mistake.”
                             Withnail and I

Informed of a rival’s demise, the scheming, turn-of-the-19th-century French diplomat Talleyrand could be heard muttering, “I wonder what he meant by that?” So goes “the great game of politics,” in which even death is perceived as but another move. Of course, real politics is no game; still, there’s a long tradition of confusing the two. It’s the same with war, which is why Clausewitz once felt it necessary to declare that “war is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end.”

To treat something serious as if it were a game is to aestheticize it − to take it out of the domain that we might call “the practical” and put it in “the aesthetic.” The practical is where we strive to fulfil our values or interests; to do things, that is, for our sakes. By contrast, in the aesthetic we take on a disinterested attitude and so do things for “their own sakes,” as the saying goes. This can be a lot of fun, and fun is the ultimate goal, but we can only reach it indirectly, which is why, to repeat the point, a game’s rules are respected for their own sakes rather than for some practical end. Why should I kick the ball in that goal or shoot the puck in this net? Because that’s how the game is played, nothing more. And why can’t I pick up the ball with my hands or kick the puck in with my skate? Because these things would violate the rules − rules, again, which exist simply because we couldn’t play without them. Of course it’s possible to play a game seriously, which is what professional athletes do, for example. But their salaries or glory are things that exist outside of the game, in the practical rather than in the aesthetic, since one can always play for free or without a care for the recognition of others.

There are three other modes of the aesthetic, and these exist alongside playing for fun and often overlap with it. They are disinterested appreciating, as when you savour something or enjoy its beauty, whether it be an artwork, a fine wine, or a person; disinterested imagining, when you fantasize by using your imagination in ways unrestricted by fact, letting it “run free”; and disinterested presenting, when you put on an entertaining show, a spectacle. … Continue reading

The Liberal-Communitarian Debate

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So shone in sunlight the fine pointed spear
That the republican poised in his right hand
With deadly aim at brilliant Dworkin
At his skin where most it lay exposed.
For nearly all was covered
By the bronze gear Dworkin had taken
From slain Sandel.
It showed only the bare throat
Where the collarbones divided neck and shoulders,
Where the death of the soul is quickest.
So here was where, as the liberal charged,
The republican drove his point home.
The end came quick, and death closed upon the lawyer,
Spirit from his body fluttered to undergloom,
Bewailing fate that made him leave his youth
And neutrality behind. And as the man died
The republican spoke. He said:

“Die, make an end.
You who has made a world
Where there is nothing worth dying for
And nothing good on TV.”

 

(Oxford 1992. With apologies to Fitzgerald and Lattimore’s Homers.)

Isaiah Berlin and the Enlightenment

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Here’s the description provided of the book edited by Laurence Brockliss and Ritchie Robertson, Isaiah Berlin and the Enlightenment (Oxford University Press, 2016): “Isaiah Berlin (1909-97) was recognized as Britain’s most distinguished historian of ideas. Many of his essays discussed thinkers of what this book calls the ‘long Enlightenment’ (from Vico in the eighteenth century to Marx and Mill in the nineteenth, with Machiavelli as a precursor). Yet he is particularly associated with the concept of the ‘Counter-Enlightenment’, comprising those thinkers (Herder, Hamann, and even Kant) who in Berlin’s view reacted against the Enlightenment’s naive rationalism, scientism and progressivism, its assumption that human beings were basically homogeneous and could be rendered happy by the remorseless application of scientific reason. Berlin’s ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ has received critical attention, but no-one has yet analysed the understanding of the Enlightenment on which it rests. Isaiah Berlin and the Enlightenment explores the development of Berlin’s conception of the Enlightenment, noting its curious narrowness, its ambivalence, and its indebtedness to a specific German intellectual tradition. Contributors to the book examine his comments on individual writers, showing how they were inflected by his questionable assumptions, and arguing that some of the writers he assigned to the ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ have closer affinities to the Enlightenment than he recognized. By locating Berlin in the history of Enlightenment studies, this book also makes a contribution to defining the historical place of his work and to evaluating his intellectual legacy.”

Replique (from the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews)

The fox, it seems, was wrong about many things. Isaiah Berlin’s accounts of Marx are “all flawed in non-trivial ways,” writes David Leopold (p. 23). And “there is no doubt that he penned a few [falsehoods] about Hume,” asserts P.J.E. Kail (p. 69). Karen O’Brien tells us that “Berlin does not provide anything resembling an accurate or rounded account of Montesquieu’s thought,” while Christopher Brooke complains that “Berlin never seems to have felt that he really had to engage with Rousseau as a serious theorist” (pp. 79, 93). Marian Hobson concludes that Berlin is mistaken to think that either Diderot or Hamann “fit into a simple category” (p. 112). Ritchie Robertson insists that Berlin would have recognized how Machiavelli is part of an alternative, minority branch of the Enlightenment if not for his “at best incomplete” account of it (p. 139). John Robertson declares Berlin’s portrayal of Vico “historically incoherent” (p. 159). And Kevin Hilliard feels a need to note that he is “certainly not claiming that Berlin was all wrong” when it comes to his account of Herder (p. 174). Lastly, we hear from Ken Koltun-Fromm that Berlin’s description of Moses Hess is more or less “seriously flawed and misguided,” and from Derek Offord that Berlin is “very partial” about the members of the Russian intelligentsia, indeed so much so that he takes us outside “the realm of scholarship, as we tend to conceive of it in early twenty-first-century academe, and in the direction of apology” (pp. 177, 199). … Continue reading

Une proposition de réconciliation

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Sorry, this entry is only available in French. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.

Un désaccord vient de surgir entre Gérard Bouchard et Charles Taylor, auteurs du rapport sur les accommodements raisonnables au Québec. Taylor n’est plus d’accord qu’il faut interdire le port des signes religieux par ceux qui exercent les fonctions dites « coercitives » de l’État, c’est-à-dire les juges et les policiers. Premièrement, la distinction entre ceux qui exercent ces fonctions et les autres n’a pas eu l’influence désirée pour le public visé. Et deuxièmement, le contexte au Québec à changer : l’interdiction proposée contribue à la stigmatisation des communautés d’où venaient les personnes visées.

Réplique

Je veux suggérer une façon de concilier les deux auteurs. Je crains toutefois qu’ils ne l’acceptent pas. Pour commencer, il faut se rappeler que la recommandation qu’il faut interdire le port des signes religieux fait suite à une remarque dans le rapport qui regarde d’un bon oeil la proposition du Bloc québécois suggérant que l’interdiction s’applique à tous ceux et celles qui incarnent l’État et sa neutralité. Il me semble pourtant y avoir ici confusion entre neutralité et impartialité. Après tout, si un intimé musulman s’interroge sur l’impartialité d’un juge juif portant une kippa, il n’aura moins des raisons de le faire face non seulement à un juge chrétien portant une croix non ostentatoire, mais aussi si le Juif remplace sa kippa par une plus petite, non ostentatoire, et aussi si tous les deux cachent leur confession en enlevant leurs symboles religieux complètement. Alors que, puisqu’il fait partie de la description de poste des juges d’avoir un bon jugement, pourquoi pas simplement leur faire confiance pour se récuser quand il y a un doute sur leur impartialité? On n’a pas besoin d’une loi. … Continue reading

Some Exceptionalism Please, We’re Canadian

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Mark Kingwell begins “No exceptionalism please, we’re Canadian” by questioning the claim that Canada is extraordinary because it is post-national, has an especially secure banking system, an impeccable public health care system, and, above all, an open-minded, tolerant immigration policy. Kingwell used to believe these things but, today, even though he’s friends with some who do believe them and have published articles explaining why (for we’re “a small country. Maybe that’s the true exceptionalism in play here?”), he doubts any and all stories about how special we are. Indeed, they remind him of the philosopher Leibniz’s theodicy, his “sad, evil idea” that God made this the best of all possible worlds. It was rightly lampooned by Voltaire because it’s obvious that the world can be improved. In any case, Americans are the ones who tend to think that they’re exceptional and it makes them impervious to criticism. Even worse is how self-congratulatory it is. Better to recognize that Canada “is not the best of all possible countries, as recent arrivals and indigenous peoples will certainly attest. We are as rife as anyone else in intolerance, bigotry and ignorance…Sorry, friends.”

Replique

“Alright that’s it. I’m voting for Kellie Leitch.” … Continue reading